dress. In particular the 'Muslim headscarf' 1 has become a powerful motif in pan European debates on multiculturalism, symbolizing the challenges posed by new patterns of religious diversity to ostensibly European values. Chief among these values, it is asserted, are a secular public sphere and women's equality with men. In this discursive milieu, two interrelated sites of contestation feature prominently: a European secular public space and the veiled Muslim woman, whose presence is construed as threatening the supposed secularity of the public sphere, the norm of gender equality and, potentially, the security of the nation. There is no doubt that if a woman is coerced to dress in a particular way, to conform to a putative religious code, her human rights are violated.
However, prohibiting Muslim women from wearing different forms of head covering in public settings to enforce a 'secular' vision of European modernity, or security, objectifies Muslim women as victims without agency, or as instruments of terror, with equally profound human rights implications (An-Na'im, 2007) . As Sara Silvestri notes:
Forbidding by law a 'symbol' of perceived oppression does not equate with solving the oppression problem [where one exists]. It might even produce another form of oppression, of coercion of conscience on the part of the state which would go well beyond reasonable concerns and security priorities. (Silvestri, 2010) While these events are unfolding in multilayered and nuanced ways, 'western feminism' has been implicated in the promulgation of punitive policies directed against Muslim women in the name protecting women's rights and equality (Scott, 2007; Razack, 2008) .
From a perspective of commitment to feminism as emancipatory politics and to critical transformative understandings of human rights, the above scenario is of deep concern (Reilly, 2009) . It raises major questions for feminist scholarship and practice extending beyond the 'Muslim headscarf' debate per se, which this article aims to address. The first set of questions relate to the prospects for articulating and enacting non-oppressive feminism(s). More than twenty years after the publication of Chandra Mohanty's influential critique of Western feminist scholarship about 'third world women ' (1988) , in contemporary Europe, it must be asked: do women from the global South, and Muslim women in particular, continue to be constructed 'under Western eyes' as passive, 1 While recognizing that there is much diversity in the form and significance of different modes of Muslim women's head and body covering, I use the term ''Muslim headscarf'' primarily in relation to the European context to connote all forms of head covering or dress used by women that signify Muslim female identity.
oppressed and in need of saving? Is a non-oppressive feminist philosophy and politics possible that both retains a commitment to women's human rights -economic, social and cultural in addition to civil and political -and actively respects women's differences? If so, what are its principles and modalities?
The second set of questions concern the need to rethink how we understand the interplay of gender, religion and power, especially vis-à-vis the public sphere and the state.
Feminist theorists have addressed the oppressive dimensions of religion in a number of ways. Some have developed critiques from within, offering alternatives to patriarchal interpretations of specific religious texts and practices (e.g. Christ and Plaskow, 1979; Gross 1992; Beattie, 2004) . Most feminist political theorists, in contrast, have adopted an implicit alignment with 'secularism' and have paid minimal attention to religion as a category except to refer to 'religious freedom' as an established norm (Cornell 1998) or to flag it as a source of harmful cultural practices (Okin 1992 (Okin , 1999 or an aspect of 'difference' (Young 2002) . This pattern in feminist theory literature is noticeably interrupted when the explicit focus is on 'women of colour' or women in global South contexts when religion often figures prominently whether as: a potential source of African American women's empowerment (e.g. Hill Collins 1990) ; or a nuanced site of contestation between the state and the Muslim minority in India (e.g. Pathak and Sunder Rajan, 1992) . Most Anglo-American feminist political theorising, however, appears to take for granted, implicitly or explicitly, that the public and societal relevance of religion is (or will be) inevitably diminished as a consequence of 'modernisation'. Within this logic, religion need not be centrally addressed in feminist theorising, except in relation to women marked by 'religiousness as difference' or vis-à-vis contexts that have yet to 'modernise'.
Increasingly, however, both the 'religious' versus 'secular' binary and the underlying assumptions of 'secular feminism' are being challenged in two key ways. First, feminist critics of the 'Enlightenment critique of religion' (ECR) who draw especially on postmodern insights are questioning the coherence of the secular-religious binary within and beyond religious studies. The second challenge, coming mostly from sociological studies, calls into question empirically and philosophically the secularization thesis per se; that is, the narrative of a single modernity wherein religion is expected to become a much diminished and private aspect of people's lives. Most sociologists of religion now agree that, viewed from a global perspective at least, the presumption of secularization as an inevitable or uniform process is no longer tenable. There is less agreement, however, on the nature, scale and normative implications of the persistence of religion as a social, cultural and political force globally.
These developments have given rise to renewed debate across a range of disciplines about the role of religion in public life. Despite the profoundly gendered nature of religious beliefs, practices, organisations and actors, and their impact in shaping women's identities and lives, to date, there has been little debate on these matters between 'religious' and 'secular' feminist academics. In the field of the sociology of religion, critical analyses are emerging, which problematise the male bias in mainstream sociological interpretations of secularisation to date (Woodhead 2008). More broadly, it is increasingly recognised that religion and experiences of secularisation (or not) are encountered differently along gender lines as these intersect with other aspects of identity and experience, especially class, 'race', ethnicity and geo-cultural location (Vincett, Sharma and Aune 2008) . It follows that such differences must be taken into account to better understand and interpret changing gendered patterns in religious (and spiritual) practices and the implications for the ongoing theorisation of secularisation. This article contributes to the complex gendering of secularisation theory, with a particular focus on how we think about and enact 'gender equality' and 'women's human rights' in contexts of a new, renewed or persistent presence of religion in the public sphere. An overarching purpose, therefore, is to map and link discussions across different fields of feminist scholarship, in the sociology of religion and in relevant currents in political theory. In doing so, I intend to posit a non-oppressive feminist response to current challenges around the interplay of religion, culture, secularism and the prospects for women's equality and human rights -formal and substantive -in democratic polities.
II. Rethinking secularization
This section outlines some key trends in academic debates on secularization and begins to consider their implications for rethinking secularism as a normative feminist principle.
David Herbert summarises the main tenets of the 'orthodox' secularization thesis that has underpinned most sociological accounts of religion until relatively recently.
Secularization theory posits secularization as an inevitable consequence of modernization characterised by: 1) social differentiation; 2) societalization; 3) rationalization; and 4) 'worldliness' (Herbert, 2003) . First, secularization has been understood as an effect of the differentiation of society into semi-autonomous spheres (e.g. political, legal, economic, scientific, educational etc) which fulfil various social functions according to the 'scientific' knowledge governing each domain. In the process, the relevance and influence of religion and religious institutions is increasingly squeezed out and limited to the domain of people's personal lives. Second, societalization refers to the decreasing incidence of face-to-face community and the rise of anonymous sub/urbanization, which erodes the hold religious values and leaders traditionally have had over individuals.
Third, rationalization describes a host of ways of explaining and representing how humans are, which it is argued ultimately trumps religious belief and superstition as ways of making sense of and shaping our world. Finally 'worldliness' describes a tendency some scholars argue is increasingly evident wherein religions are becoming more oriented towards social or political issues, or self-improvement, and less concerned with 'transcendence' of the material world; that is, a kind of 'internal secularization' of religions.
Empirical evidence on secularization
The empirical evidence on actual patterns of secularization in different contexts is contradictory. Focusing on declining rates of church attendance and/or membership in the most stable, and prosperous nation states in North West Europe, for example, Steve Bruce (1996) argues that there is a decisive overall trend toward secularization as 'modernization' occurs. However, against this, he also finds that participation in traditional religious practices remains high in countries where the formation of national identity and religion have been intertwined historically (e.g. Ireland, Poland).
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart (2004) (Berger, 1999; Davie, 2002; Herbert, 2003) . Heelas et al (2005) offer support to both sides of this debate; focusing primarily on evidence from the United Kingdom (UK), they concur that secularization, understood as the declining influence of organised religions and churches, has accelerated since the 1970s, while at the same time different forms of 'spiritualism' have gained followers in both the UK and the United States. Underlining the interrelation of descriptive and prescriptive accounts of secularization, and echoing arguments by feminist writers discussed further below (Shaheed, 1989; Al-Ali, 2000) , Herbert also notes that in post-colonial contexts where the 'secular state' is construed as an imposition from the West, critiques of indigenous religions are unlikely to garner popular support or legitimacy (Herbert, 2003:55) .
Particularly relevant to this article, focusing on religion in the public sphere, José Recently, updating his theory of public religion (building on work by Alfred Stepan), Casanova argues that religion de facto has been continually present in public spheres in a majority of contexts, including long established democracies, despite the rhetoric of the 'secular modern state' (Casanova, 2008; Stepan, 2000) . These conclusions are also consistent with recent findings of the EU VEIL research project (Values, Equality in Liberal Democracies), which adds a feminist dimension to empirical work that contradicts a singular secularization thesis. This seven-country European study documents much variation within Europe in state responses to the 'Muslim headscarf', which is linked to significant differences in the model of church-state relations, traditions regarding antidiscrimination, and prevailing cultural and legal concepts of citizenship in each of the countries studied (e.g. Kiliç, Saharso and Sauer, 2008) .
The concept of neo-secularization
Recognizing that there is considerable variation in actual patterns of secularization in different contexts, and that teleological assumptions of a singular, inexorable path of secularization is untenable, is secularization still a valid concept? Eschewing postmodern declarations of the dawn of a post-secular modernity wherein the 'secularization as modernization' thesis is completely jettisoned, most scholars in the field of sociology of religion have not abandoned the concept. Instead, they have to one degree or another sought to develop more nuanced and complex frameworks for researching and analyzing secularization, which some label neo-secularization (Chaves, 1994) . Reflecting this broad approach, Herbert stresses the need to distinguish between the political and social 'significance' of religion and its cultural 'vitality'. While it is generally agreed that the former has declined, at least in Europe, he argues that the failure to pay attention to continuing and/or changing forms of cultural significance of religion in all societies is a major gap in analyses that only consider the formal influence of religion. Scholars in this vein, therefore, call for multilevel analyses (micro/individual, meso/organizational, macro/societal) that map the relationship between social change and religious change in context-specific studies (Malesevic, 2009 As the critique of the secularization thesis deepens, however, debate is emerging even in those currents of normative political theory criticized by Sandel, which have been most resistant to a role for religion in the public sphere. Most notably, Habermas in recent writings concedes greater space to religious-based arguments within his account of dialogic rationality, which for him underpins democratic societies. He argues:
The liberal state has an interest in the free expression of religious voices in the public arena… It must not discourage religious persons and communities from also expressing themselves as such in the political arena, for it cannot be sure that secular society would not otherwise cut off itself from key resources for the creation of meaning and identity.. 
III. Feminist critiques of the 'Enlightenment critique of religion'
In Reclaiming the Enlightenment ( ideas, including conscience and freedom' (Bronner, 2004:3) . In this section I discuss three currents of feminist scholarship that have challenged the Enlightenment critique of religion (ECR) in different ways. These are: feminist studies in religion (FSR), postmodern feminism; and feminist communitarian political theory.
Feminist studies in religion
FSR has roots in 'second wave' feminism of the late 1960s and 1970s which sparked new critical engagement with religion, shaping a substantial and still expanding literature on women and gender in religion. Initially, the main orientation of this work was to challenge the 'problematic nature of exclusively male God-language' and the 'falsity of dualistic thinking' -principally in Judeo-Christian traditions -while 'valuing women's experiences and history' in religion and arguing the 'need to create new ritual as well as theology' (Christ and Plaskow, 1992:vii) . Still influential today, such efforts to develop postpatriarchal (re)interpretations of religious texts, traditions, practices, representations and histories, were especially formative through the mid 1990s (Daly, 1978; Schüssler Fiorenza, 1984 Christ and Plaskow, 1979; Gross, 1996) . Since its inception, not least in response to early trenchant criticism about the failure of the new discipline to include the perspectives and analysis of women of colour (Lorde 1984) , FSR has evolved into an inclusive and multidisciplinary intellectual space. In recent decades, FSR has responded to various challenges to 'nuance and deepen … [feminist] understandings of religion' (Plaskow, 2001:536) . This is evident in a steady growth of writing emphasizing the diversity of women's experiences and identities within and across religious traditions, especially in terms of 'race', ethnicity, class, sexuality and location (Plaskow and Christ, 1989; King 1995; King and Beattie, 2005) . It is also reflected in the influence of postmodern intellectual currents and a general shift away from 'essentialist'
understandings of women and gender in religion (Daly, 1978; Starhawk, 1979) in favour of constructivist approaches (King, 1995; Anderson and Clack, 2003) . FSR, therefore, has yielded a rich body of scholarship both within the discourses of theology as well as in philosophy, psychology and psychoanalytic theory and anthropology, classics, history and literature, which has been largely bypassed in 'secular' feminist literatures.
By definition, feminist studies in religion, as part of theology and/or religious studies, represents a persistent though marginalised challenge to the Enlightenment critique of religion. In contrast, since the 1990s, the postmodern intellectual movement has been extremely influential in challenging Enlightenment thinking more broadly and unsettling epistemological underpinnings in many disciplines across the humanities and social sciences. On the face of it, anti-universalist, postmodern philosophy directed at the deconstruction of grand narratives is an unlikely ally of theology. Recently, however, scholars in feminist studies in religion are increasingly drawing on now widely established feminist/postmodern insights to contest the secular-religious distinction as a false and oppressive binary. For example, Tina Beattie argues that defining religionfocused scholarship as either: religious/ biased or secular/impartial, fails to understand core feminist epistemological insights including "recognition that the researcher and researched are caught up in a mutually subjective and transformative encounter that involves a high degree of personal commitment and trust". Instead, Beattie notes, the secular-religious binary reinforces a false idea of religion as a 'reified and bounded "thing"… in a scientifically and rationally knowable universe' (Beattie, 2005:68) .
Elizabeth Castelli also problematizes the operation of the secular-religious divide along similar lines:
It has been an obstacle to some conversations that many feminists, whether activists or academics, have tended to read 'religion' as an abstraction solely in negative terms -reading 'religion' only as a constraint ideologically and institutionally, and reading the embrace of religious affiliations or allegiances as a sign of false consciousness. This negative rendering of 'religion' is in many respects an ironic holdover from Feminism's own Enlightenment inheritance. (Castelli, 2001:5) Arguably however, this stand-off is beginning to shift as elements of a common analytical approach come into focus. Sustained critiques of Enlightenment rationality and progress (exemplified in the secularization thesis), combined with the normative imperative felt by many to formulate non-oppressive responses to the ongoing moral panic around 'Islam in the West', appear to be opening new avenues of potential dialogue across the hitherto polarized areas of 'secular' feminist scholarship and feminist studies in religion. Perhaps ironically, this is most evident in the increasing engagement of influential 'secular' postmodern feminist thinkers with questions of religion, secularism and the public sphere.
Postmodern feminist interrogations of secularism
Recent work by Joan Wallach Scott and Judith Butler exemplify a new, explicit postmodern feminist engagement with religion, which extends feminist critiques of the ECR. Specifically, their analyses explicate the oppressive discursive practices that attend the gendered operationalization of 'secularity as modernity' culminating in, as Judith
Butler describes it, 'cultural assaults' on religious minorities (Butler, 2008:3) . In the The principle of secularism might be described historically as one which protects the political sphere from the determining influence of a dominant religion while recognizing religion's public (social, cultural) importance -it is not only a private, individual matter, (Scott, 2007:97) Hence, 'drawing the line on Islam' through attacks on the Muslim women's dress, Scott argues, is a 'distortion of that nation's own history'; such actions she argues have more to do with excluding Muslim populations from France than defending the European values of secularity or indeed gender equality. generate 'an alternative political framework' and 'another sense of modernity' (p. 6).
Importantly, like Scott, Butler also couches her critique within a commitment to democratic politics; she underlines that her point is 'not to abandon freedom as a norm' but to 'resist its coercive instrumentalization…and [to] have another meaning that might remain useful for a radical democratic politics' (Butler, 2008:3) . From Scott's perspective, with which I agree, the preoccupation with enforcing the principle of secularism is the wrong one; the real concern is 'the democratic outcome' rights-based ideas of liberty) as implicated in oppressive immigration policy practices (Butler, 2008:6) . In this regard, Scott and Butler leave little room to salvage equality and human rights based contestations of gender based oppression, especially as it intersects with other forms of oppression, based on 'race', religion, and so on. More positively, and perhaps intimating a move to reclaim the emancipatory values of the Enlightenment, they pin their hopes for addressing such abuses in some form of democratic renewal, which they point to but do not fully develop. It is difficult to envisage how these hopes can be realised, however, unmoored from critically reinterpreted, bottom-up principles of equality and human rights. I will develop this point further in subsequent sections.
Communitarian feminism and religion in the public sphere
The third strand of feminist scholarship that expressly challenges the Enlightenment 
IV. Feminism, religion and democracy on the critical edges of the Enlightenment
In feminist scholarship that is critical of the Enlightenment but retains a significant commitment to the radical promise of its ideals, there are two dominant approaches to religion: first, as noted earlier, feminist political and social theorizing that typically deals with religion as an absence; and second, a substantial body of feminist political sociology, which primarily focuses on the harmful effects of politicized religion and religious fundamentalisms (Jeffrey and Basu, 1998; Anwar, 2009; Shaheed, 2009 ).
The absence of religion in feminist theory
Especially in the work of influential western feminist political theorists, religion is generally ignored as an empirical horizon or as a category of analysis. While not a conclusive test, a cursory review of the index pages of a selection of widely used texts in the field (Young, 2002; Bryson, 2003; McLaughlin, 2003; Harding, 2004; Hartsock, 1998; Okin, 1992) indicates that none have included 'religion' or a related term.
Notably, however, feminist theory texts that focus on the experiences and perspectives of women in the global South tend to include substantially more references to religion, although usually along the negative lines noted above, also evident in the political sociological literatures (e.g. Mohanty, 2003; McCann and Kim, 2010; Nussbaum, 2000; Tripp et al., 2009 ).
On one level the absence of religion even in western feminist political theory is puzzling.
As an area of scholarship concerned with examining the gendered exercise of power across public and private domains, clearly much remains to be interrogated within all major religions wherein: 'men hold most or all of the roles of authority and prestige' and 'from these positions....control and dictate the norms of the [religion] for all women" (Gross, 1996:106) . On another level, the silence on religion confirms the observations of Beattie and Castelli that most such scholarship retains an unexamined Enlightenment view of religion -as the antithesis of rationality and freedom. Aside from burgeoning critiques of the secularization thesis per se, however, the persistence of this view of religion in feminist political theory is at odds with quite basic feminist critiques of the public-private divide, which now underpin the most moderate liberal feminist agendas (evidenced, for example, by the focus on remedying domestic violence or securing 'family friendly' conditions of work). Hence, even if it is accepted that the influence of religion is or ought to be confined to the 'private sphere', it surely remains relevant to the theorization of the gendered exercise of power along the personal to political spectrum?
This point is especially salient in light of research indicating that women make up the majority of actively religious people worldwide (Furseth and Repstad, 2006:190-1; Woodhead 2008) . Hence, if women make up the majority of religious (or spiritually oriented) people worldwide, it follows that 'feminism' --as a conceptual and practical project concerned with the 'emancipation of women' --must acknowledge the role of religion in women's lives in more complex and nuanced ways than has happened to date..
Western centric treatments of religion
As flagged earlier, the presumption of religion as non-relevant in influential feminist theory texts highlights a problematic western bias. It assumes that regressive, gendered religious practices are really only a problem for women in societies that are 'not modern' Undoubtedly, much feminist scholarship at the intersection of religion and politics has roots in a liberal Enlightenment tradition epitomized by a commitment to women's equality and human rights. However, despite 'freedom of religion' also being a cornerstone of this tradition, because religion is frequently implicated in endorsing subordinate roles for women relative to men and/or harmful cultural practices, equality and rights feminism tends to view religion primarily as a threat. Much criticism has been levelled against this brand of feminist thinking as inevitably Western-centric and neoimperialist (Razack, 2008; Grewal, 1999) . Susan Okin's essay "Is Multiculturalism Bad
for Women" (1999), for example, is often cited (somewhat unfairly) as epitomizing this The 'war on terror' narrative is infused with gendered and racialized perceptions prevalent in the West, which equate Islam with fundamentalism and 'terrorism'. This makes Muslim and other minorities in the West more vulnerable to intolerance, discrimination and state-sponsored abuses of human rights (Fekete, 2004) . In addition to affecting women as members of targeted minority communities, as seen in conflicts over the 'Muslim headscarf', these trends have wider gender-specific implications. For example, minority women often play a daily interfacing role between their communities and the majority population (for example, around accessing housing, education, healthcare and other services) and, in this regard, can bear the brunt of prejudice and discrimination against the community, which they are perceived to represent. Further, in situations of heightened tension between minority and majority communities, minority women who are experiencing abuse within the family or community are extremely unlikely to seek assistance if they fear that they will be stigmatized for betraying the community and/or that they or their abuser will be subject to maltreatment by the authorities.
In this context, feminist critics of religious fundamentalist movements (Saghal, 2004; Imam and Yuval-Davis, 2004) have problematised how some multicultural political positions in the West, ostensibly aiming to redress harms caused by imperialism and contemporary forms of racism and xenophobia, work against women. Flagging the dangers of communitarian politics, Saghal has criticized British multicultural policy in particular, which initially allowed certain social policies to be determined by conservative male community leaders. In response to 'secular' Asian feminist pressure to address crimes against women in these contexts (especially forced marriage), British politicians and policy-makers, reflecting a dominant progressive understanding of multiculturalism, looked for religious arguments (Hindu, Sikh, Muslim) to justify legal and policy interventions against forced marriage. In doing so, however, Saghal argues, they 'resorted to developing support amongst the very people [they] wanted to criticise, and thereby helped increase their hold over "their" communities' (Saghal, 2004:58) .
Similarly, regarding 'Muslim headscarf' debates, arguments from a multicultural perspective can err in focusing only on impediments to Muslim women to wearing Muslim dress, but not on the right of a Muslim woman not to do so if that is her wish. In doing so, they fail to acknowledge and address the conflicts that regularly arise when the self-determination of a woman clashes with the 'beliefs of the community.' This underlines that, to the extent there is a problem in relation to a woman wearing a 'Muslim headscarf' or not, it is the problem of maximizing the conditions of her selfdetermination. If a woman is forced to, or prohibited from, wearing any form of 'Muslim headscarf', whether by an individual or a state actor, it is equally unacceptable from an emancipatory feminist perspective.
In global South contexts, cultural essentialist arguments are similarly mobilised by autocratic, politicised religious movements that conceal gender-based oppressions in the name of enforcing authentic communal religious integrity and rejecting Western secularism. Such movements tend to emerge in situations of rapid social change. Around the world, processes of decolonisation, national independence, modernisation, and globalisation have generated a 'bewildering pace of change' and a need to construct new histories and (re)create identities and ways of belonging at the individual, community and national level (Shaheed 1989, 4) . In the global South, most fundamentalist initiatives have roots in a legacy of Western 'colonisation and hegemonic rule and control' (Shaheed 2001, 3) . After the initial optimism prompted by decolonisation processes in the 1950s and 1960s, disillusionment set in as it became clear that none of the available paradigms -nationalism, capitalism or communism -could meet most people's material, social and spiritual needs (Imam and Yuval-Davis 2004) .
Writing about secularism, gender and the state in Egypt, Nadje Al-Ali (2000) (Mukhtar, 2003; Shaheed, 1989 (Othman, 2006) . In Malaysia, the process began in the 1980s when the National Front coalition government led by
Mahathir Mohamad endeavoured to win the support of the majority Muslim population and keep the more radical Islamist party (PAS) out of power. A process of systematic administrative and legal reform ensued, which put over 100 Islamic scholars at the centre of federal policy-making mechanisms. At the same time, the Shari'ah judicial and legal system was strengthened and extended to the detriment of women (Othman, 2006:344) .
In particular, 'polygamy and divorce have been made easier for men' and, increasingly, women who have been 'divorced, abandoned, beaten up or neglected by their husbands . . . In some European contexts this imagined clash of civilizations has played out particularly intensely around whether or not the state should ban different modes of Muslim women's dress in public settings (Skjeie, 2007) . This is a reminder of the absolute centrality of women and gender power relations in the interrelation of religion, culture and the state. underpin it as the larger discursive frame in which ideas of secularism and secularity can be redefined with emancipatory intent. This common ground in democracy is, I argue, at the heart of non-oppressive articulations of feminism that both retain a commitment to norms of gender equality and human rights and actively respect women's differences, including in relation to religious identity.
Third, as shown in the literature reviewed in section II above, it is now generally accepted that the presumption of secularization as an inevitable and singular process of modernization is no longer tenable. Empirical evidence shows much variation in how religion manifests across and within societies, at micro, meso and macro levels, and how its influence changes with other social changes, waxing or waning in different times, under different conditions. Importantly, it is also clear that there is also significant Any vision of feminism that aligns automatically with anti-religious expressions of secularism, or blanket condemnations of Muslim women's dress as an offensive symbol of the oppression of women, is untenable as a basis for emancipatory feminist practice in a globalised and neo-secular age. Elsewhere I have developed an account of cosmopolitan feminism that outlines the tenets of a non-oppressive globally-oriented feminism (Reilly, 2007) . It proceeds from the premise that on balance "women have been and continue to be oppressed in diverse ways and for diverse reasons" (Karam, 1998:5) . Most importantly, however, cosmopolitan feminism entails recognition of the complex and often contradictory intersectionality of women's identities and experiences cutting across gender, socio-economic privilege, ethnicity, religion, sexuality, geo-location, and so on (Brah and Phoenix, 2004; Crenshaw, 1991; Yuval-Davis, 2006) . It also requires recognition that this complexity can only be understood through dialogic practice.
Embracing such a feminist ontology of intersectionality, then, demands that the content of any practical emancipatory agenda, aimed at transforming gender oppression, can only be formulated in mutually respectful dialogue. It cannot be imposed by one group of women or men on another group of women in the name feminism. Moreover, this cosmopolitan feminist perspective embeds feminism in democratic practice oriented towards the substantive realization of human rights and freedoms.
The 
